Category Archives: Legal Journal

Judging Judges – Is there a need for greater judicial scrutiny?

I attended Cheryl Thomas‘ inaugural lecture at the Judicial Institute at UCL last Wednesday where she talked about judicial studies and in particular, the study of judges and juries. I’d never really thought about judicial studies until I was trying to find empirical evidence of the behaviour of juries in criminal trials for a paper I was writing. All I found was a study from the early 1990s – The Crown Court Study, by Professor Michael Zander and Paul Henderson, so I used this slightly outdated evidence, feeling a little disheartened about my research skills. At the lecture I found out that this paper was in fact one of the few empirical studies of juries in the UK. Thomas described the study of juries in the UK as a as a “black hole” with academics remaining cautious about conducting research in the area, for fear of breaching Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act.

Royal Courts of Justice Photo courtesy of Gareth Davies

However it is not only the study of juries that is largely neglected in the UK, but perhaps more surprisingly, the study of judges is also neglected even though this wouldn’t be limited by the Contempt of Court Act. This paucity of research could be due to a number of factors, most notably the commonly held belief that the judiciary should not be interfered with. In 1955 Lord Kilmuir famously claimed that there is a need for ignorance to “protect” the judiciary from scrutiny, establishing the so-called Kilmuir rules. This changed in the 1980s when these rules were revoked. In March, the current master of the rolls, Lord Neuberger, stated in a speech to the Student Law Society at Birmingham University:

“it seems to me only proper that judges, with their wisdom and experience, should be free to comment extra-judicially on a wide range of issues. In doing so they play an educative role. In areas such as constitutional principles, the role and independence of the judiciary, the functioning of the legal system, and access to justice, and even important issues of law, this role cannot be underestimated.”

His assertion that members of the judiciary should be able to make extra-judicial comments as well as having a public profile also came with a warning that judges must be cautious about what they say publicly.

In the US the area of judicial studies has greatly evolved since the 1950s with prominent academics such as Theodore L. Becker making it a well respected field of study. In the UK there has been little attempt to study the work of judges, the book by JAG Griffith on politics of the judiciary is based on very little empirical evidence and has failed to encourage further study. This also means that assertions made by those who write or comment on behaviour of the judiciary, as well as assumptions or sweeping statements, often go unchallenged regardless of their accuracy.

Thomas claimed that academics in England and Wales lack curiosity in relation to the judiciary, but she also stated that while they are not in opposition with judges, they do not have a great deal of contact with one another. It appears to her that academics have lost touch and no longer have the appropriate skills to study the judiciary.

The key problem in the judiciary of England and Wales lies with judicial appointments and the failure to improve diversity. While there is some progress being made in relation to the number of women appointed in the judiciary, the number of black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) candidates remains very low. The current appointments to the judiciary of England and Wales are significantly unrepresentative of society, this is not only regarding gender and ethnicity but also taking into account socio-economic background.

The judiciary of England and Wales is often cited as being one of “the best” legal systems in the world. Although there is no international study to confirm or reject such an assumption, there is evidence to suggest that it fares very well in comparison to other states in terms of corruption and speed. Nevertheless it’s reputation is tainted by its poor diversity statistics, the public debate on the issue of diversity has become sterile and unproductive as a result of progress being so slow.

Establishing judicial studies as a respectable and rigorous academic field could not only increase public understanding and interest in the judiciary, but it could also serve to improve the quality and openness of our legal system.

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Guest Post by Professor Martine Herzog Evans: Is Prison Leave a Privilege?

Martine Herzog-Evans is a Law Professor at the University of Reims, France and specialises in criminology and prison law.

The Case – European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Boulois v. Luxembourg, applic. n° 33575/04

Mr Boulois, was imprisoned in Luxembourg, he filed several requests in order to obtain prison leave, which were all rejected by the Prison Board. He then lodged an application for judicial review with the Administrative Court. However, the Administrative Court denied it had jurisdiction to examine the application. In his application against the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Mr Boulois claimed that Article 6§1 of the ECHR had been violated arguing that he did not have access to a fair hearing or to a court. After the First Section of the ECtHR ruled in his favour, the government of Luxembourg requested for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber.

The Ruling

« The Court reiterates that for Article 6 § 1 in its “civil” limb to be applicable, there must be a dispute… over a “right” which can be said… to be recognised under domestic law» (§90)

«  the Court observes that section 6 of the 1986 Law defines prison leave as… a “privilege” which “may be granted” to prisoners in certain circumstances» (§96)

« Thus it was clearly the legislature’s intention to create a privilege… the present case concerns a benefit created as an incentive to prisoners ». (§98)

« … the applicant could not claim, on arguable grounds, to possess a “right”» (§101)

« Furthermore… although the Court has recognised the legitimate aim of a policy of progressive social reintegration of persons sentenced to imprisonment… neither the Convention nor the Protocols thereto expressly provide for a right to prison leave» (§ 102).

« There has therefore been no breach of Article 6 » (§105).

Observations

In some European states, release and prison management decisions such as whether to grant prison leave, are deemed ‘administrative’ and are made by the executive. However, in France and other European countries such as Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, they are deemed to be of a ‘penal’ nature and a judge makes the decision. This often consists of a  hearing, where a lawyer can defend the inmate and, appeal, and even access to the highest court (Padfield and al. 2010). It appears that there is no clear consensus in Europe as to the very nature of what French law calls ‘sentence management measures’.

Despite ruling in Ganci v. Italy (30 Oct. 2003, n° 41576/98) that Article 6 applied to a disciplinary sanction if it affected civil rights such as family contacts; and in Enea v. Italy (Gd Chamber,  17 Sept. 2009, n° 74912/01), that a security prison regime affecting visitation did affect ‘civil rights’; in Boulois, the Grand Chamber analyses the request for prison leave as not being of a ‘civil’ nature. According to Luxembourg’s legal system, prison leave is a ‘privilege’ which aims at ‘encouraging’ prisoners, this corresponds to the historical view that prison leave is used to control prisoner’s behaviour. In view of modern penological goals, prison leave now serves two purposes: firstly, to allow prisoners to prepare their future and inevitably – except for lifers – release (e.g. by trying to find a job) ; secondly, to keep in contact with their families. Family rights are particularly important as they play a key role in deterring crime and are protected under Article 8 (Maruna, 2001; Farrall, 2002).

Prison leave should not be seen as a ‘privilege’. As stated above, in most modern nations, it is no longer seen as being a purely behavioural tool. It is true that most legal systems contain provisions which state that inmates ‘may’ or ‘can’ be granted prison leave. The ECtHR has itself ruled several times that by using the word ‘can’ does not mean that the authority or judge has full discretionary power ( Lambourdière v. France, 2 Aug. 2000, n° 37387/97 and Camps n. France, 23 Nov. 1999, n° 42401/98). It has been argued numerous times (e.g. in Herzog-Evans, 2012), that such legal provisions should be interpreted reasonably. Indeed when the law states that an offender ‘can’ be released or granted prison leave, it does not imply that he has an absolute right to either. Conversely, it does not mean that once all legal conditions and requirements are met, the court or governing authority can still deny the offender’s application simply ‘because it can’. One should not confuse discretion with whim. According to a fairer interpretation, when a legal system uses the verb ‘can’, it means that once all legal requirements are met – and this should include the protection of the public – then the authority or court should grant release or prison leave. In other words, even when ‘can’ is used, there is indeed a right to prison leave once its conditions are met.

According to the Grand Chamber, however, there is no such thing as a European principle of ‘reintegration’. The court only refers to the conventions and protocols, without mentioning recommendations. Recommendations may be deemed as being mere ‘soft law’; nonetheless, they do represent a consensus between European countries. Precisely, and to quote only a few, the European Prison Rules (2006, preamble), the European Probation Rules (2010, section 2), and Recommendation (2003)22 (preamble) all refer to reintegration as being a fundamental principle. In other words there is indeed a consensus amongst European member states relating to the importance of reintegration.

Finally, one must look at the bigger picture: the right to a fair trial as laid out in Art. 6, is not only a humanitarian procedural luxury that Western countries can afford.  Fair trial is first and foremost the mark of a democracy. In most modern democracies, the right to a fair trial conquers more and more legal territories. In France, for instance, it now applies to disciplinary sanctions, solitary confinement decision-making, release, recall, and other sanctions. Besides, from the criminological viewpoint, Art.6 is an essential component of the legitimacy of justice. As empirical studies have shown (Tyler, 1990; Tyler and Huo, 2002) it fosters compliance (Liebling, 2007) – probably substantive compliance as opposed to instrumental compliance (Robinson and McNeill, 2008) – in other words it is essential to grant leave from prison in order to prevent reoffending.

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